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CURRENT LEGISLATION
"personal service without the state in lieu of publication," so that
by merely driving outside of the city limits, he can accomplish what
another could not by going to California, namely, evasion of personal
service in lieu of publication. It is apparent that the new section
was designed to relieve a plaintiff from the expenses of publication
where there is only a small sum involved, the Municipal Court having
jurisdiction only of actions where the amount involved is under
$1,000,3r by providing a cheaper means of service upon elusive de-
fendants whose property is within the jurisdiction of the court. The
publication statute was intended to apply to a large degree to defen-
dants, departing or removing property from the city, with intent to
evade service or defraud creditors. It is therefore quite probable
that the new section, since it allows such personal service in all cases
where publication is ordered, was intended to apply to persons with-
out the city, whether within the state or not, there being no reason
for any such restriction on its use. It is apparent, however, that the
section as it now stands cannot apply to persons who remain within
the state. Where words of a statute are as clear and unambiguous
as they are here, no interpretation other than a strictly literal one
can be given, especially in view of the many decisions which hold that
provisions for methods of service other than personally within the
jurisdiction are in derogation of the common law, and must be strictly
construed.3 6
It is submitted that the effect of the section as it now stands is
improperly and unnecessarily limited and that it should be amended
by replacing the words "without the state" with the words "without
the city or without the state."
MORTON S. RoBsoN.
AMENDMENT TO THE GENERAL CONSTRUCTION LAw RELATIVE
TO QUORUM AND MAJORITY.-Effective March 21, 1948, Section 41
of the General Construction Law defining the terms "quorum" and
"majority" was amended on the recommendation of the Law Revision
Commission' to read as follows:
QUORUM AND MAJORITY. Whenever three or more public
officers are given any power or authority, or three or more per-
35MuNIc. CT. CODE § 6.3 BKorn v. Lipman, 201 N. Y. 404, 406, 90 N. E. 861, 862 (1911), wherein
it is said: "The general rule in regard to the service of process . . . is that
process must be served personally within the jurisdiction . . . . Substituted
service when provided by statute is in derogation of such general rule, and,
consequently, the directions thereof must be strictly construed . . . ." Erikson
v. Macy, 231 N. Y. 86, 131 N. E. 744 (1921); Rome Trust Co. v. Cummings,
123 Misc. 884, 206 N. Y. Supp. 728 (Sup. Ct. 1924).I N. Y. LAW REvI sION CoMMIssIoN REPoRT, LFS. Doc. No. 65(H)
(1948).
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sons are charged with any public duty to be performed or exer-
cised by them jointly or as a board or similar body, a majority of
the whole number of such persons or officers, at a meeting duly
held at a time fixed by law, or by any by-law duly adopted by
such board or body, or at any duly adjourned meeting of such
meeting, or at any meeting duly held upon reasonable notice to
all of them, shall constitute a quorum and not less than a ma-
jority of the whole number may perform and exercise such
power, authority or duty. For the purpose of this provision the
words "whole number" shall be construed to mean the total
number which the board, commission, body or other group of
persons or officers would have were there no vacancies and were
none of the persons or officers disqualified from acting.2
(Amended matter in italics.)
The purpose of the amendment was to clarify an ambiguity as to
the number of votes required for the exercise of the powers conferred
upon public bodies of three or more members. It was the rule at
common law that, when the power to act was conferred by statute
upon several persons, all were required to act before the power could
be exercised.3 The rule requiring action by all was too rigid, how-
ever, to meet the exigencies of modern times. The plain purpose of
Section 41, as originally enacted,4 therefore, was to abrogate the
common law rule, the section permitting three or more public officers
given any power or authority, whether acting as a group, an un-
incorporated board, or as a corporate body, to act through a majority
of a quorum. The salutary effect of the old Section 41 was indis-
putable. The fact remains, however, that this section was in deroga-
tion of the common law rule, and the tendency of courts has always
been to construe such statutes strictly.5 The legislative intent should
therefore be manifested in unmistakable language, leaving little room
for judicial interpretation. Careful perusal of the old statute reveals
rather glaring deficiencies in language creating problems of construc-
tion, some of which are worthy of mention. Through an evaluation
of the old statute, the needed legislative reform can be more readily
perceived. Section 41 formerly read:
QUORUM AND MAJORITY. Whenever three or more public
officers are given any power or authority, or three or more per-
sons are charged with any public duty to be performed or exer-
cised by them jointly or as a board or similar body, a majority
2 Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 320.
3 People ex rel. v. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375 (1871). The court there held
that where a vacancy existed among commissioners, the power of the remaining
commissioners was suspended until an appointment should be made. See Morris
v. Cashmore, 253 App. Div. 657, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 624 (1st Dep't 1938).
4 Laws of N. Y. 1892, c. 677.
r Burnside v. Whitney, 21 N. Y. 148 (1860) ; People v. Schaller, 224 App.
Div. 3, 229 N. Y. Supp. 492 (1st Dep't 1928).
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of all such persons or officers at a meeting duly held at a time
fixed by law, or by any by-law duly adopted by such board or
body, or at any duly adjourned meeting of such meeting, or at
any meeting duly held upon reasonable notice to all of them, may
perform and exercise such power, authority or duty, and if one
or more of such persons or officers shall have died or have be-
come mentally incapable of acting, or shall refuse or neglect to
attend any such meeting, a majority of the whole number of
such persons or officers shall be a quorum of such board or body,
and a majority of a quorum, if not less than a majority of the
whole number of such persons or officers may perform and ex-
ercise any such power, authority or duty. (Ambiguous matter
in italics.)
Let us consider these phrases separately. What is meant by the
statutory phrase, "a majority of all such persons or officers"? If a
town board consists of five members, but one office is vacant and one
member is disqualified, can two of the remaining elect a person to
fill the vacancy? In Matter of Crosby v. Van Valkenburgh 6 it
was necessary to resort to Section 41 of the General Construction
Law in an effort to clarify Section 64(5) of the Town Law. The
court there answered this question in the negative. In that case the
court correctly argued that Section 41 of the General Construction
Law applies only in the absence of some governing statute to the
contrary, as the General Construction Law itself so provides.7 This
phrase now reads, "a majority of the whole number of such persons
or officers." In order to make the meaning of this phrase absolutely
clear, the new statute adds another sentence, "For the purpose of
this provision the words 'whole number' shall be construed to mean
the total number which the board, commission, body or other group
of persons or officers would have were there no vacancies and were
none of the persons or officers disqualified from acting." This latter
phrase removes also the third ambiguity referred to above. With re-
spect to the words, "a majority of the whole number of such persons
or officers shall be a quorum," the same question presented itself,
namely, did the statute mean the total number of qualified and acting
incumbents or did it refer only to the number of persons required to
constitute the full membership of the particular board or body? By
definition a quorum is such a number of the officers or members of
any body as is competent by law or constitution to transact business.8
It has been held that there are two rules as to a quorum in legislative
6 178 Misc. 746, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 301 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
7N. Y. GEN. CoNsT. LAW § 110 provides: "Application of chapter.
This chapter is applicable to every statute unless its general object, or the con-
text of the language construed, or other provisions of law indicate that a dif-
ferent meaning or application was intended from that required to be given by
this chapter."
8BLAcx, LAW DicTIONAaY (3d ed. 1933).
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bodies: 9 one where the quorum is fixed by the power creating the
body, in which it is clearly unnecessary to resort to the General Con-
struction Law, and the other where the quorum is not fixed by such
power, in which case the general rule is that a quorum is a majority
of all the members. To illustrate the ambiguity of the phrase under
discussion: If the authorized membership of a board is nine, but
actually there are only seven qualified members, would four, a ma-
jority of the qualified members, or five, a majority of the authorized
members, constitute a quorum? Under the new statute there can be
no doubt that the answer is five.
The clause which reads "if one or more of such persons or offi-
cers shall have died or have become mentally incapable of acting, or
shall refuse or neglect to attend any such meeting," also posits a num-
ber of problems. A literal reading of the provision might be con-
strued to mean that a majority of the whole number shall constitute
a quorum only in the event that one or more of such persons shall
have died, become insane, or refused or neglected to attend. Assume
a board to consist of seven members, three of which have become
disqualified. All seven members attend a meeting. Manifestly none
of the members are dead or mentally incapable, nor have they
neglected or refused to attend. The argument might well have been
raised that, in this situation, the statute failed to define a quorum
because none of the conditions of the "if" clause existed. On the
other hand, a different function might have been ascribed to the "if"
clause. It is possible that the legislative intent was not to count
among the "whole number" those who were dead, mentally incapable
or refused or neglected to attend. Although it is unlikely that this
actually was the intent of the legislature, as stich interpretation would
permit one to act alone if all the other members neglected to attend,
the statute was nevertheless open to that construction in its original
form. This phrase has now been entirely eliminated from the sec-
tion, being replaced by more precise wording, as follows: ". . . a
majority of the whole number of such persons or officers, at a meet-
ing duly held ... shall constitute a quorum and not less than a ma-
jority of the whole number may perform and exercise such power,
authority or duty."
Finally, the statute provided that a majority of the quorum "if
not less than a majority of the whole number" may act. Assume a
board of seven members. Four members would constitute a quorum.
Would a vote of three or four be requisite for binding action? 10
9 Cleveland Cotton Mills v. Commissioners of Cleveland County, 108 N. C.
678, 13 S. E. 271 (1891).10 In Erie Railroad Co. v. City of Buffalo, 180 N. Y. 192, 197, 73 N. E.
26, 28 (1904), the court said, "According to the rules which govern corporate
bodies, and deliberative or elective assemblies composed of a definite number
of persons, a majority of the whole number is necessary to constitute a legal
meeting, and the number necessary to constitute a quorum remains the same
even though there may be vacancies in the membership."
[ VOL. 23
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The issue was squarely presented to the court in Matter of Talbot
v. Board of Education of City of New York."' In that case the court
held that, where seven members comprised the Board of Education,
and of the seven only four were present at a meeting, one of the
four not voting, the striking out of certain specific items from the
budget on the votes of the remaining three present was invalid as
contravening Section 41 of the General Construction Law. Greene
v. Goodwin Sand & Gravel Co. 2 is also a case in point. There the
defendant, a gravel company, applied to the Highway Commissioners
for discontinuance of 2,000 feet of a highway. By a majority vote
the commissioners declared the highway abandoned. Application was
then made to the Town Board, whose consent was necessary to au-
thorize the action. This board consisted of six members, two of
whom declined to participate while a third was away. Only three
were qualified to vote, one less than a majority. The court held that,
inasmuch as the required number of persons necessary to make a
quorum had not participated at the meeting, the consent was ineffec-
tual for binding action. This phrase has also been removed from
the new statute as the new definition is complete without it.
While it is true that courts have almost uniformly handed down
decisions which were apparently consistent with the legislative intent,
as indicated by the cases cited, so that the present amendment is gen-
erally a codification of the previous interpretation of the statute, the
fact remained that the statute itself should be easily susceptible of
but one interpretation both by lawyers and by those public officials
who are wanting in legal training and who are often called upon to
construe this section. It is submitted that the new Section 41 attains
this objective. The words "quorum" and "majority" are simply de-
fined and easily understood. It would seem that the amended sec-
tion has effectively dissipated the clouds of uncertainty and ambiguity
which formerly enveloped the statute and has removed the last
vestiges of doubt as to legislative intent occasioned by the loose and
cumbersome phraseology of the old statute, thus reducing the neces-
sity for much future litigation.
IsADOR LIDDIE.
AMENDMENT TO DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW RELATIVE TO DIS-
SOLUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR INCURABLE INSANITY.-At common law
a marriage with a lunatic was void, not merely voidable.' The ra-
tionale of this rule was that an insane person was not capable of
11 171 Misc. 974, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 340 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
1272 Misc. 192, 129 N. Y. Supp. 709 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
11 BL. Coi. 438; Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N. Y.
1820); Winslow v. Troy. 97 Me. 130, 53 At. 1008 (1902); Floyd County v.
Wolfe, 138 Iowa 749, 117 N. W. 32 (1908).
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